Today, we’re discussing an increasingly relevant topic: power outages. When the lights go out, how do we react? Are we truly prepared to face hours, or even days, without electricity? Can we be equipped with a survival kit for such situations, including technical broadcasting tools like batteries or radios that don’t require electric power?
We caught up with Carlos Salema, co-author of the report on SIRESP, the Portuguese State’s Communications Network, Professor and Expert in telecommunications at Instituto de Telecomunicações, to learn more about this issue. During the blackout, SIRESP suffered devastating failures, with more than 75% of its base stations compromised.
1. What critical vulnerabilities in Portugal's emergency communications system (SIRESP) were exposed during the 2025 Iberian blackout, and why is it essential to prioritize maintenance and backup systems moving forward?
The general blackout that struck the Iberian Peninsula on April 28, 2025, once again revealed the chronic vulnerabilities of Portugal’s Integrated Emergency and Security Networks System (SIRESP), the State’s emergency communications network. This incident, described as the most severe in Europe in the past 20 years, exposed structural and operational failures that compromised the response capabilities of security forces, firefighters, and the national emergency medical service (INEM) during critical moments. As a telecommunications expert, I believe it is essential to reflect on the lessons learned from this event and propose concrete measures to ensure the robustness, reliability, and resilience of SIRESP, with a particular focus on proper maintenance and the implementation of effective backup systems.
2. How did the 2025 blackout expose the technical and structural weaknesses of SIRESP, particularly regarding battery autonomy and satellite redundancy, despite significant public investment in its modernization and maintenance?
During the blackout, SIRESP suffered devastating failures, with more than 75% of its base stations affected, according to a report by SIC. In regions such as the Algarve, INEM lost all communications due to power outages at base stations, and in Montalegre, firefighters reported system collapses after only 2.5 hours. In Porto, a generator failure shut down 108 base stations for 70 minutes, highlighting the fragility of the infrastructure. These failures are not new. Since its inception, SIRESP has been plagued by issues, with critical incidents such as the Pedrógão Grande wildfires in 2017 (with 100 fatalities, a clearly erroneous figure) and now the 2025 blackout.
The primary technical cause identified during the blackout was the insufficient battery autonomy of the state stations, which were designed to operate for only six hours. The blackout lasted over eight hours, exceeding this capacity, and 15.2% of base stations lost functionality after 8.5 hours. Although a modernization plan called for batteries with 10-22 hours of autonomy, only 26.7% of the 600 base stations had been equipped with this technology at the time of the crisis. Additionally, the satellite redundancy system, implemented after 2017, proved ineffective, undermining the promise of uninterrupted communications.
3. What are the three fundamental pillars that ensure the reliability of an emergency communications system like SIRESP, and how did each of them fail during the 2025 blackout?
The reliability of an emergency communications system like SIRESP depends on three fundamental pillars: modern infrastructure, rigorous maintenance, and effective redundancies. In the case of the blackout, all three pillars failed.
Outdated Infrastructure: Most base stations operate with obsolete batteries incapable of withstanding prolonged crises. Modernization efforts, though planned, are progressing at an unacceptably slow pace. Only 160 of the 600 antennas had updated batteries, revealing poor management of invested resources.
Insufficient Maintenance: The fragmented management of SIRESP, spread among multiple companies (Altice Labs, Motorola, NOS, among others) responsible for operation and maintenance, hindered coordination during the crisis. The generator failure in Porto (which inexplicably lacked a backup power source) and the response from MEO, which disclaimed operational responsibility, underscore the lack of clarity in contracts and oversight. The absence of leadership at Siresp S.A. since March 2024 has further worsened the situation, as the board of directors lacks members with technical expertise in telecommunications systems.
Ineffective Redundancy: The satellite redundancy system, a major investment post-2017, failed to fulfill its intended purpose. Furthermore, the reliance on poorly maintained generators and the lack of robust contingency plans for prolonged power outages exposed the system's vulnerabilities.
4. Why is it crucial for the government to move beyond the announcement of SIRESP's replacement and focus on immediate, concrete actions to prevent repeating past failures in the new emergency communications system?
The government announced the formation of a technical team to propose the urgent replacement of SIRESP within 90 days, acknowledging that the system “demonstrated structural and operational limitations.” More important than this announcement is the need for immediate, concrete actions to ensure that the next system does not repeat the mistakes of the past.
Proactive Maintenance: A preventive maintenance regime must be implemented, including regular audits of base stations, generators, and backup systems. Coordination among contracted companies should be centralized, with clearly defined responsibilities and penalties for non-compliance.
Robust Backup Systems: Base stations should be equipped with higher-capacity batteries (minimum of 12–18 hours) and generator engines. The satellite redundancy system must be tested and optimized to ensure it functions under extreme conditions.
Skilled Leadership: Siresp S.A. requires technically qualified leadership with experience in critical communications systems. The lack of a president with telecommunications expertise since 2024 is unacceptable for a system of this importance.
Simulations and Training: Regular crisis scenario simulations, such as blackouts or natural disasters, should be conducted to identify vulnerabilities before they manifest. Training for SIRESP operators must be enhanced to ensure they can effectively use the system under stress.
5. Why does the 2025 Iberian blackout demonstrate the urgent need for a complete overhaul of SIRESP, and what key elements must be prioritized to ensure Portugal’s emergency communications system can withstand future crises?
The 2025 Iberian blackout was a clear warning: SIRESP, in its current form, is not the solution Portugal needs. Its failure compromised the safety of millions of citizens by leaving emergency forces without communications during critical moments. Without a holistic approach that prioritizes rigorous maintenance, robust backups, and realistic drills, we risk repeating the same mistakes. As a telecommunications expert, I feel the responsibility to demand a system that not only works under normal conditions but also withstands the most extreme challenges. The security of the country depends on it.
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